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Abstract 
In this paper we focus on the recent restructuring of the Italian pension 
system and in particular on the reforms concerning the tax-favored 
retirement saving accounts. These reforms issued in the early and mid-
1990s reduced the riskiness of private retirement saving plans and their 
overall cost. We find that private pension saving incentives had little if any 
effect on household savings. Further, those workers who have experienced 
the most severe public pension cut are not significantly more likely to 
contribute to a private retirement plan, ceteris paribus. We find, however, 
that the pension fund legislation had a strong effect on the allocation of 
savings and triggered substantial substitution of non-tax-favored non-
retirement wealth for tax-favored pension funds. 
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Saving rates of Italian households, which have been constantly declining through the 
1980s and early 1990s, have started resuming since the late 1990’s. According to Rossi 
and Visco (1994, 1995) part of the decline was due to the social security reforms of the 
1970s, which led to a progressively more generous system. This trend ended in the first 
half of the 1990s, when two subsequent reforms - Amato (1992) and Dini (1995) – 
substantially diminished the retirement wealth of many Italian households. Recent studies 
by Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) and Bottazzi, Jappelli and Padula (2003) have 
convincingly shown that the loss of retirement wealth may explain part of the recent 
increase in saving rates. Furthermore, these authors show that, ceteris paribus, saving 
rates have increased more for those households whose retirement wealth has been 
reduced more. In fact, households were penalized in different degrees by the reforms, 
depending on observable characteristics: public sector, younger, and educated employees 
were hit more than relatively older, private sector, uneducated ones.   
Besides reducing households’ retirement wealth, the reforms of the 1990s have 
regulated the market for private retirement savings with a set of new laws that define the 
basic principles for the discipline of pension funds and retirement saving plans. The aim 
of these acts was to boost and protect long term private savings, which should 
supplement the public pension income, through tax incentives and a strict market 
discipline. A market for tax-favored retirement saving instruments existed before these 
reforms, however it was barely regulated and, consequently, potentially risky. As pension 
plans are very long term and illiquid assets - because with few exceptions they cannot be 
cashed before retirement -, regulation greatly reduces their risk. 
This paper assesses the impact of pension fund regulation on Italian household 
savings and it is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to quantify this effect of the 
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2 Specifically, we address two issues. The first one concerns the 
implications of the legislation for household savings. In particular, we are interested in 
determining whether the regulation of pension funds has generated extra savings, on top 
of what was triggered by the loss of retirement wealth due to the pension reforms. The 
second one concerns the identification of those who invest in these tax-favored saving 
vehicles. 
Whether tax-favored retirement saving instruments increase net saving, and in 
particular the savings of those cohorts which were most severely hit by the pension 
reform, is of critical importance to future generations of elderly and to the health of the 
economy in general. All policies that give tax-favored status to some saving instrument 
are costly as they imply a loss in tax revenues. Therefore, in order for these policies to be 
successful, public sector dissavings must be offset by a substantial increase in private 
sector savings, and not simply by a reshuffling of existing wealth among the available 
saving vehicles. Similarly, contributions to retirement accounts will not increase private 
savings if they are financed by borrowing or by current period savings that would have 
occurred anyway. Nevertheless, saving for retirement through contributions to retirement 
saving plans can be desirable in itself even if it occurs through the reallocation of 
resources from other instruments. In fact, pension fund investments are generally a form 
of long-term savings which can be cashed in before retirement and used for current 
expenditure only at a cost. 
Our analysis suggests that the pension fund legislation has had little, if any effect 
on household saving flows. Further, those who have experienced the most severe public 
pension cut do not contribute more, nor are more likely to contribute to a private 
retirement plan, ceteris paribus. However, the legislation has not been completely 
ineffective because the generous tax incentives attributed to retirement saving 
instruments have triggered a non-negligible substitution of non-retirement for retirement 
wealth. 
                                                 
2 The studies by Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) and Bottazzi et al. (2003), mentioned earlier, analyze 
the impact of the public pension cut on household savings. Elsa Fornero in several papers and book 
contributions (see her home page at http://web.econ.unito.it/fornero/pubblicazioni for a list of recent works) 
has been following and analyzing critically the policy debate on the Italian pension reform and on the 
savings for retirement incentives. Messori (2006) and Cesari et al. (2007) focus on the Italian market for 
pension funds and describe its evolution over time, the current trends and future outlook.  
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How does our evidence compare with the other available? To date, most of the 
available studies of the impact of private retirement schemes on household savings refer 
to the United States,
3 for which however there is not much agreement on the issue. 
Overall, our results are similar to those of Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) and Engen, Gale 
and Scholz (1994) and (1996) who find that, despite the very different social security 
system, also in the US households financed their private pension contributions from 
existing savings or from saving that would have been done anyway. In addition Engen et 
al. find that also US households significantly substituted private pensions for other assets. 
By contrast, Poterba, Venti and Wise who have undertaken many studies of the effect of 
pension fund contributions on US net personal saving reach very different conclusions. 
The differences appear to be due partly to differences in the data used, partly to 
differences in the methods used to control for saver heterogeneity, but the question is still 
debated.
4 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly introduce the 
market for pension funds, discuss the pension fund legislation and present the data used 
for the empirical analysis. In Section 3, we evaluate the impact of the pension fund 
legislation on household savings.  In Section 4, we verify to what extent those who have 
been affected the most by the pension reforms have exploited the pension fund 
legislation. In Section 5, we summarize the results and conclude. 
2.  Background 
2.1.  The pension fund legislation
5 
The basic principles for the discipline of retirement saving plans, intended to supplement 
public pensions, were set in 1993 (legge 124/1993). Shortly after 1993, a number of 
interventions followed, which helped to shape the Italian private pension system.
6 The 
                                                 
3 There is not much evidence for other countries. Despite the financial imbalances of most social 
security systems and although in recent years the governments of several large European countries have 
scaled back public retirements benefits and developed and subsidized new channels for private retirement 
savings, most governments have not gone too far in this direction or have done so only in the most recent 
past. Hence, the diffusion of pension funds remains limited in most of these countries and data are scarce. 
4 See Poterba, Venti and Wise (1997) for an attempt to reconcile the existing evidence. 
5 See the Appendix for a brief history of the Italian pension legislation. 
6 These interventions concerned mainly the enrollment criteria to open- and closed-end pension funds  
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current legislation envisages two “supplementary pillars” of social security: the first 
consists of occupational and other collective pension funds; the second consists of 
individual retirement accounts. 
  Before 1993, a supplementary social security system was in place, but was barely 
regulated and at the beginning of the 1990s only around 3 percent of workers contributed 
to the system.
7 Private pension funds were available but only to some workers as they 
belonged to some large firm, such as some multinational companies which provided their 
employees with private schemes (with or without the employer matching employee 
contributions), or to some sector (e.g. banking, insurance, or journalism) or worker 
association, organization or union (e.g. management). Alternatively, savers could invest 
in insurance-based saving schemes which could be turned into a capital or an annuity at 
retirement. These latter products, which shared most characteristics with the post-1993 
individual retirement accounts, were sold by banks and insurance companies and were 
widely available to everybody. Contributions to pension funds and to these schemes were 
tax deductible.
8 
  The 1993 legislation and subsequent interventions encouraged the creation of a 
proper private pension system as a relevant supplementary pillar of social security. 
Explicit criteria were established regarding pension fund governance, asset allocation 
strategies, contributor insurance and activity transparency and supervision. The 
legislation had several effects. First, it increased the transparency of pension fund 
investments and reduced their riskiness (real and perceived), as it subdued their providers 
to strict rules of conduct. Second, it spurred an intense debate around pension funds, their 
features and use, which may have reduced the (fixed) costs of information of investing in 
these products. In fact, pension funds are quite complex financial instruments in terms of 
risks and benefits and their cost in terms of information gathering and processing can be 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the competition between insurance companies, selling individual retirement saving policies, and the 
banking sector, dominating the pension fund industry. Among these acts, the most important one was a 
1995 law. 
7 Estimate based on the number of contributors to the funds existing before the pension reform, as 
reported in the COVIP 1998 Annual Report. 
8 See Messori, 2006, for a description of the system in place before the reforms.  
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expected to be quite high. Finally, the increasing competition among providers has 
brought about also fee cuts.
9 
2.2.  The data 
We analyze the impact of the pension fund legislation using data from the Bank of Italy 
Surveys of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which are run every two years.
10  We 
consider the pre-reform years 1989 and 1991 and the post-reform ones 1998 through 
2006 (5 surveys) and exclude the 1993 and 1995 surveys which were carried out when 
most of the social security and pension fund reforms took place. Each survey contains 
interviews from a random sample of around 8,000 Italian households and collects 
detailed data on household balance sheets together with thorough information on 
demographic characteristics, income and other variables.
11 We carry out the analysis at 
the household level. Carrying out the analysis at the individual level is problematic for 
two reasons. First, it is only from 1995 onwards that information on who in the household 
contributes to a pension fund is available. The 1989 and 1991 surveys report only 
whether  someone in the household contributes to a pension plan.
12 Second, many 
variables that are relevant for our analysis such as total savings and wealth are available 
only at household level. 
From the initial sample, we drop those households whose heads are aged less than 
20 or more than 60 (because of the complications in modeling savings by the very young 
and the elderly) and those who are not in the labor force (e.g. the retired, the unemployed, 
                                                 
9 The legislation has recently expanded the fiscal benefits of pension fund investment with the faculty of 
deferring taxes on up to approximately €5200 of contributions from around €1300. See Messori (2006) for 
details. 
10 The 1998 survey is an exception because it was run three years after the previous survey.  
11 See Brandolini and Cannari (1994) for a discussion of the sampling methodology, measurement and 
other issues concerning the surveys. 
12 In the 1989 and 1991 surveys, households were asked the following question: “In 1989(1991), did 
someone in your family contribute to a supplementary pension scheme?”. If so, they were asked to report 
the amount contributed. From 1995 onwards, they are asked the following question: “In (year), did 
someone in your family, alone or with employer contribution, contribute to a private (or supplementary) 
pension scheme, annuity plan, or any plan designed to build a lump sum for your future needs?”. If the 
answer is positive, they are asked to report who in the family contributes, whether it is an individual or 
collective scheme, with or without employer contributions, when they started contributing and the amount 
contributed.  
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first-job seekers, students, housewives, …). This leaves us with about 3,500 households 
per year.
  
  Table 1 reports some statistics on the distribution of private pensions in the pre- 
and post-reform years. Overall, the percentage of households with someone contributing 
to a private pension has risen over time and gone from less than 9 percent to 15 percent 
after the reforms. In the post-legislation period, the share of households whose head 
contributes to a pension fund is just over 12 percent, which implies that, in around 3 
percent of households, it is someone other than the head that holds a private pension. The 
table reports also the ratio of households with someone contributing to a private pension 
to the number of individuals who work (potential contributors), which has risen from 5 to 
9 percent. 
We then distinguish among post-legislation “young”, “middle-aged” and “old” 
workers.
 The label “young” identifies the labor force segment that has been affected the 
most by the Amato and Dini pension reforms and whose public pension wealth has been 
cut most severely.
 The label “old” refers to the group that has been affected the least by 
the reforms. The “middle-aged” denotes the group in between.
13 “Young”, “middle-aged” 
and “old” are not well-defined categories of workers in the pre-reform period as the 
pension reforms were yet to be implemented. Hence, participation rates according to this 
classification are not reported for the pre-reform years. In the 1998-2004 period, the rates 
of participation in the market for pension funds among the “old” and the “middle-aged” 
are higher than among the “young”.
14 
Finally, we distinguish among private- and public-sector payroll employees and 
the self-employed. The pension reforms hit public-sector employees and the self-
                                                 
13 The label “young” denotes those households whose head has started contributing to the social security 
system after the end of 1995. The label “old” denotes those households whose head had contributed to the 
social security system for 18 years or more at the end of 1995. The label “middle-aged” denotes those 
households whose head had started contributing to the system before 1996, but had contributed for less than 
18 years at the end of 1995. 
 
14 A criticism that could be made is that the figures in the table might overstate participation among the 
“old” and the “middle-aged” and understate the participation among the “young” because the classification 
is based on the labor market experience of the household head, who is often the oldest individual in the 
house, whereas the pension fund contributor could be someone other, and possibly younger (i.e. a child) 
than the head. However, in our data, in 94 percent of cases the pension fund contributor is either the head or 
the spouse, who often have similar ages and education and, consequently, contribution histories.  
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employed relatively more than private-sector employees. It turns out that private pension 
holding is highest among the self-employed, whose replacement ratio has traditionally 
been lower than that of payroll workers and has fallen further after the reforms. Holdings 
by public sector workers, whose public pension cut was also substantial, increased 
substantially after the reform, but remain low compared to the other groups of workers. 
After the reforms, participation among private sector employees doubled, reaching a level 
indistinguishable from that of the self-employed. The sharp increase in participation 
among the private sector employees could be due to the provision of “closed” 
supplementary pension funds promoted by the social partners (trade unions and sectoral 
employers' associations) - and thus by non-profit organisations. These “closed” funds are 
established by collective agreements and are available only to those workers employed in 
the firm or sectors for which the union signed the collective agreement establishing the 
fund. There are no such funds for public sector employees, with the exception of 
education employees. 
At the bottom of the table, we report household median (nominal) contribution 
and the median contribution-to-income ratio. Contributions are below the limit for the tax 
benefit, which was set to around €1300 per person until 2000 and then raised to around 
€5200.
15 As a ratio of income, contributions have held basically constant over time. 
Table 2 presents data on demographic and financial characteristics of contributors 
and non-contributors during the pre- and post-legislation periods. The Table shows that 
there are significant differences in income, assets and net wealth between those with and 
without pension funds. The differences between the two groups are quite stable across the 
periods. The median contributor earns 30 percent more income, has twice as many 
financial assets and almost 70 percent more wealth than the median non-contributor. This 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that pension funds are a costly instrument, in 
terms of brokerage and management charges and fees, and are available only to wealthy 
investors. Furthermore, it seems that the median pension fund holder has enough 
financial (liquid) assets to be able to exploit the tax benefits by reallocating some of her 
wealth into pension funds, without increasing her saving rate, but still maintaining a 
                                                 
15 Excluding the survey on 2000 and restricting the sample to 2002 through 2006, we find that the 
median contribution is around 1400 euros per household per year (vs. less than 800 in the 1989-1991 
sample).  
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sizable buffer stock of wealth. The issue is whether she actually does it. The fact that she 
does not contribute to the limit for tax deferral implies that the pension fund legislation 
may still provide a marginal incentive to save.  
Contributors’ saving rate is 20 percent higher than non-contributors’, which is 
consistent with both the hypothesis that contributors exhibit a greater propensity to save 
and with the hypothesis that the fiscal incentives of pension fund contributions have a 
positive effect on household savings. 
Pension fund holders are more likely to own their home and invest more in real 
estate, despite the fact that housing can be viewed as a substitute for pension funds. In 
fact, real estate, in excess of owner-occupied housing, is a type of long-term investment 
and, like pension funds, it is largely illiquid.
16 However, contributors may substitute 
between pension funds and housing by taking out larger mortgage loans, by not 
accelerating mortgage repayments or by not trading up into a bigger house. This may be 
indeed the case as they appear to be more likely to hold a mortgage. On the other hand, 
the greater percentage of indebted households among contributors may be read as 
evidence that this group has easier access to credit which makes them more inclined to 
hold illiquid assets in general. 
As a final point, pension fund contributors are more educated in terms of years of 
schooling. They are also more likely to hold some relatively complex financial 
instrument such as stocks, corporate bonds or mutual funds. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that it is the more financially educated who take greatest advantage of the tax 
shield, but it could be simply related to the fact that these households are substantially 
wealthier than the median household and typically have more diversified portfolios. 
3.  Pension funds and household savings 
The issue of whether the availability of tax-favored retirement plans increases household 
savings has been studied extensively in the US where saving programs for retirements, 
                                                 
16 Engen and Gale (1995 and 1996) show that when accounting for housing equity non-401k wealth of 
401k eligible households fell relative to non-401k wealth of 401k ineligible households. This suggests that 
in the US 401ks did not raise overall wealth, although they may have had a limited impact on financial 
wealth.  
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such as Individual Retirement Accounts –IRAs– and 401(k)s
17, have been in place since 
the early 1980s. Whether IRA and 401(k) contributions represent new savings or are 
simply a substitute for other financial savings is still controversial (see Poterba, Venti and 
Wise, 1996, for a review of the literature on this issue). 
The key impediment to determining the effect on savings of retirement plans is 
saver heterogeneity, which complicates the empirical analysis. Some people save more 
than others and, those who do, tend to save more in all forms. If investors in retirement 
accounts exhibit a relatively higher propensity to save and would have saved the same 
amount without the tax incentives, these incentives simply represent a transfer from 
taxpayers to savers. It is extremely difficult to establish how much the same household 
would have saved without the tax incentive and comparing the behavior of contributors 
and non-contributors may be misleading. Further, evidence that contributors accumulate 
more non-retirement assets than non-contributors is not proof of no substitution between 
saving instruments, in the presence of unobservable heterogeneity in the taste for savings. 
Thus, the crucial feature of any analysis of the issue is how to control for this unobserved 
heterogeneity in the taste for savings. 
We control for saver heterogeneity by assuming that participation in a pension 
fund or in a retirement saving scheme is a proxy for individual unobserved heterogeneity 
in the taste for savings. This assumption is common to most studies of private retirement 
savings that use successive cross-sections.
18 Then, we can appraise the effect of the 
pension fund regulation of the early 1990s using a difference-in-difference (DID) 
estimator, exploiting the fact that even before 1993 households could contribute to 
retirement saving plans. In fact, even though not all households could invest in a pension 
fund, all could enroll in a tax-favored insurance-based retirement saving scheme. 
Technically, the DID estimator allows to control for the unobservable 
heterogeneity in the taste for saving if the latter is not affected by the reform,
 so that the 
average tastes for saving among contributors and among non-contributors are the same 
                                                 
17 IRAs are available to all employees and contributions are tax-deductible up to a limit. The popularity 
of this program has fallen over time as the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has limited the tax benefits. The 401(k) 
plans are available only to employees of firms that offer them. Deposits in 401(k) are also tax-deductible 
and the returns accrue tax-free; taxes are paid upon withdrawal. Their popularity has risen over time. 
18 Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995), Gale and Scholz (1994) and many others make the same assumption 
in their studies for the US.  
  11
before and after the reform, i.e. are constant over time. The assumption of no reform-
related changes in the taste for savings is common to all studies of the effect of private 
retirement schemes that use DID. However, its validity cannot be taken for granted, as we 
discuss below.
 19 
In practice, our empirical methodology can be illustrated as follows. Let Yh,t 
denote the savings of household h in period t, where t = pre if the household is surveyed 
in year 1989 or 1991 and t = post if it is surveyed after 1995. Let D
c
h,t be a dummy equal 
to 1 if the household contributes to a retirement saving program in year t and D
post
h,t be a 
dummy equal to 1 if the household is observed in the post-legislation period. We estimate 
the following regression: 








t h t h X D D D D Y , , , , , , , ' ε α δ γ β + + + + = .         (1) 
As mentioned earlier, the pension fund contribution status dummy (D
c
h,t) is intended to 
capture any unobserved heterogeneity in the taste for savings: β  captures the differences 
in Yh,t between contributors and non-contributors that are due to unobserved differences 
in their preferences for savings. The post-reform year dummy (D
post
h,t) accounts for 
aggregate shocks to savings that are common to all savers: γ  captures the effect on Yh,t of 
all shocks that may have modified household behavior over time. Xh,t denotes a vector of 
household socio-demographic characteristics, controlling for systematic differences in 
attributes that might affect the amounts of savings (non-retirement assets) of contributors 
and non-contributors.
20 Finally, ε h,t is a zero mean error, which is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the Xh,t and which can be decomposed as follows: 
t h t t h t h , , , µ ω φ ε + + = ,          ( 2 )  
                                                 
19 The DID method relies on two other assumptions: (i) exogeneity of the reform with respect to 
individual decisions – in particular to saving decision, and (ii) common time effects across groups. As far 
as the first assumption is concerned, we believe that the endogeneity of the pension fund regulation can be 
ruled out. In fact, it was implemented as part of a major social security reform package, which was in turn 
prompted by the huge budget deficit and the severe political crisis of the early 1990s, which was 
exacerbated by the dramatic devaluation of the Italian lira in 1992. The second assumption requires that, 
except for the pension fund legislation, all other shocks affecting savings that have occurred over the period 
considered are aggregate and affect contributors and non-contributors in the same way. We checked the 
validity of this assumption by comparing pension fund contributors and non-contributors over time with 
respect to savings. The common trend assumption appears to hold because the curves for the two groups 
are roughly parallel. Graphs are available upon request. 
20 If the group of contributors were not significantly different from that of non-contributors, the 
difference-in-difference approach would consist in simple differences of the means of the left-hand-side 
variable.  
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where  φ h,t is an individual specific effect capturing the unobservable preference for 
savings, ω  t is a common macroeconomic effect and µ  h,t is the standard residual, possibly 
capturing any measurement error. If the unobserved heterogeneity, φ h,t, for savings is 
constant over time, then: 
() () 0 0 | 1 | , , , , , , = = − − = −
C
t h pre h post h
C
t h pre h post h D E D E ε ε ε ε , 
and differencing savings across groups and years gives: 
[ ] [ ] {}
[] [] {} . 1 , 0 | 1 , 1 |
0 , 0 | 0 , 1 |
, , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
δ = = = − = =
















t h t h
D D Y E D D Y E
D D Y E D D Y E
 
Hence, the difference-in-difference estimator, which can be implemented by running 
OLS on (1), is unbiased. The coefficient δ  provides an estimate of the impact of the 
pension fund legislation on the amount of savings of pension fund contributors, 
separating the effect of the policy from that of other unobserved factors that possibly 
changed over the same period. 
However, if individuals select into pension fund contributing according to some 
unobservable rule that depends on the policy and, as a consequence of this, the 
unobservable propensity to save among contributors and non-contributors changes with 
the reform in a systematic way, the unobservable preference component, φ h,t, will not be 
eliminated by differencing. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that systematic 
compositional changes may occur. In fact, it can be objected that the legislation has 
brought to the pension fund market households with a lower taste for savings because it 
has made pension funds more easily available and has reduced their cost. 
The problem can be illustrated as follows. Let’s write the unobservable individual 




, t h h t h φ φ φ + = ,         ( 3 )  
where φ
0
h is an individual fixed effect and φ
1
h,t is a time-varying effect. If: 
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and DID is biased. Notice that the direction of the bias is unclear because when the most 
dedicated savers among non-contributors become contributors both the average taste for 
savings among contributors and that among non-contributors fall. It is even possible that 
the two effects cancel out. However, if, after the reform, the average unobservable 
propensity to save falls among contributors relative to non-contributors, the estimator will 
underestimate the impact of the reform. Instead, if the drop is relatively larger among 
non-contributors, the estimator will overestimate it. Instrumental variable estimation can 
address this problem of systematic compositional changes.  
3.1.  The empirical evidence 
As mentioned, our goal is to determine whether the Italian pension fund regulation of the 
early 1990s, which has lowered the riskiness and cost of private retirement saving 
schemes, generated new savings by increasing contributor savings. Also, we appraise its 
impact on the stock of non-retirement assets to check whether households finance their 
contributions by reallocating their wealth to exploit the fiscal benefits. If, after the new 
regulation and relative to non-contributors, contributors save less and/or accumulate less 
non-retirement assets, one cannot rule out that the pension fund legislation has led to 
some substitution across saving instruments. If, instead, there is no difference between 
contributors and non-contributors in terms of non-retirement assets before and after the 
reforms, there would be no evidence of substitution. In this instance and in the absence of 
a saving increase by contributors, the reform would turn out to be ineffective, but not 
costly from a tax-payer perspective. Finally, an increase in contributors’ savings would 
support the hypothesis that the reform achieved its objectives. 
  In practice, by estimating equation (1) we can check whether, over the period 
considered, the change in contributors’ savings and non-retirement assets is significantly 
different from the change in non-contributors’. Since, from the descriptive analysis, 
systematic differences are apparent for education, marital status, income, home-
ownership status and debt, in our regressions we include all these and some other socio-
demographic variables that could influence behavior. Further, in order to address the 
issue of reform-related compositional changes, we run two-stage least square (TSLS). As 
instruments, we use 9 dummies for the sector of main employment of the household  
  14
head.
21 For the instrument to be valid, they have to be correlated with pension fund 
contribution status (i.e. with the choice of joining a pension fund), but must be otherwise 
independent of savings. Our choice can be rationalized by the fact that most pension 
funds have been set up by trade unions and sectoral employers’ associations and are 
available only to the workers of that sector. On the other hand, the sector of employment 
does not appear to affect the amount of savings once we control for income, education 
and other observable characteristics. 
  It is worth mentioning that our study is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to 
address the issue of reform-related systematic compositional changes among contributors 
and non-contributors. In contrast, as mentioned, the large literature on the effects of 
retirement saving programs on savings in the US typically simply rules them out. 
  Table 3 reports the estimates of the coefficient of interest, δ , based on regressions 
for household savings. The estimates of the coefficients on the other controls, listed in the 
note to the table, are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request. In the first 
two columns of the table we look at total savings, computed as difference between total 
household income and expenditure on non-durable goods and services. The OLS estimate 
of δ  is positive, but small and statistically insignificant, which suggests that contributors’ 
savings did not change relative to non-contributors’ after the pension fund legislation was 
passed. In the second column we report the results of TSLS estimation to control for 
reform-related composition bias. The partial R
2 of the instruments is around 0.005, which 
suggests that the instruments leave a large fraction of variation in pension fund 
participation unexplained. This is however typical for microdata. Nevertheless, the 
instruments are jointly highly significant (p-value = 0.0000). At 9.35 the F-statistics of 
the first-stage regression is only a bit lower than the rule of thumb of 10 suggested by 
Staiger and Stock (1997), below which the TSLS estimator is likely to have some bias 
towards the OLS estimator and (small) size-distorted confidence intervals due to weak 
                                                 
21 See the notes to the tables displaying the results for a complete list of the socio-demographic 




22 The table also reports the Hansen J statistic and its p-value from an 
overidentification test that show that we cannot reject that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the regression residual with 5 percent confidence.  The TSLS δ  falls 
substantially with respect to the OLS estimate and becomes negative, but remains 
insignificant. Thus, based also on the TSLS results we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the reform had no impact on household savings.
23 
  In the last two columns of table 3 we look at non-retirement savings, computed as 
total savings minus any contribution to pension funds. Both the OLS and TSLS estimates 
imply that after the reform also the non-retirement savings of contributors did not change 
relative to those of non-contributors. This is additional evidence that composition 
changes in the two groups, if any, are not a significant source of bias. In fact, if the 
legislation had induced less dedicated savers to invest in pension funds, we would expect 
a drop in contributors’ non-retirement savings. Instead, we find that the estimated δ  is 
statistically insignificant. 
24 
  Table 4 reports the estimates of the coefficient δ  of equation (1) based on OLS 
regressions for various definitions of non-retirement assets as dependent variable. We do 
not report TSLS estimates because they fail to pass the test of overidentifying restrictions. 
Nevertheless, the TSLS estimates are similar in sign and significance to the OLS ones 
and are just slightly larger in magnitude (absolute value), but also the standard errors are 
larger, like in the regressions for savings. In the first two columns we look at liquid 
financial assets, which consist of bank accounts and government bonds. We do not 
consider share, corporate bond and other risky asset holdings because ownership of these 
assets is not widespread and is higher among pension fund contributors, who are 
wealthier on average. Hence, stock market fluctuations (aggregate shock) tend to affect 
contributors’ non-retirement assets more than non-contributors’, in violation of the 
                                                 
22 The simulations in Stock and Yogo (2005) suggest that with an F-statistic greater than 6.65 we can 
reject at a 5% significance level the hypothesis that the maximal bias of the TSLS estimator relative to OLS 
is greater than 0.2. 
23 We have experimented also with a wider set of instrument including the interactions of the sector 
dummies with the dummy for post-reform years. The results are unchanged. 
24 Notice that Wu-Hausman F tests of regressor exogeneity do not reject the null of no systematic 
changes in participation due to the reform both for the regression for total savings and for that for non-
retirement savings.  
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assumption of common time effects across groups. The estimated δ  is negative and 
statistically significant. This suggests that contributors’ liquid assets fell relative to non-
contributors’ after the reform was passed, i.e. we cannot rule out that  contributors 
financed their investment in pension funds by substituting out of some of their liquid 
wealth. The effect is economically large because the reduction in liquid assets 
corresponds to over 25 percent of the sample mean (17 percent of average total financial 
wealth).  
  In the other columns of the table, we verify whether pension wealth shows up as a 
reduction in other net worth, which appears to be the case for the US as illustrated by 
Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994) and Gale (1998). Examining the substitution between 
pension funds and housing wealth is motivated by the fact that both are illiquid, tax-
preferred assets that are often held for long periods. Since homeownership is widespread, 
and housing represents a substantial fraction of most households’ wealth, ignoring 
savings that occur in housing may severely understate household savings. Furthermore, 
home equity loans, such as mortgages, allow to extract equity from one’s home. Based on 
the analysis, over the reform period, contributors’ real assets increased relative to non-
contributors’. Part of this increase was financed through higher debt, but the overall 
effect was a rise in their total net real assets – in contrast with the evidence for the US. 
These results are robust to a split between homeowners and renters. 
4.  Who invests in pension funds? 
As mentioned earlier, the pension fund legislation was part of a pension reform 
package aimed at reducing public expenditure on pensions. The pension reform had a 
differential impact on different groups of workers
25 and was such that, at retirement, the 
most severely hit by the pension reform are likely to receive public pension benefits 
which are not adequate to enjoy decent standards of living. The pension fund legislation 
was intended to help these workers to accumulate (private) pension wealth in order to 
offset the public pension cuts. Hence, from a policy perspective it matters whether these 
workers, for whom the pension fund legislation was issued, exploit this instrument and 
                                                 
25 See Table A1 in the Appendix for a summary of the implications of the reform on workers’ 
replacement ratios.  
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take advantage of the tax savings. The question can be addressed by looking at relative 
changes in the amounts saved and at the diffusion of private pension.  
Once again a direct comparison between categories would not help to see whether 
the most affected by the pension invest relatively more in pension funds and this can be 
accounted for by the pension fund legislation. In fact, any change in the behavior of the 
most affected pension fund contributors relative to the least affected contributors is most 
likely due to the public pension reorganization. Further, in the case of the “young”, 
appraising the extent of their participation in the market for pension funds (relative to the 
“old”) is not straightforward because this is the demographic group that is most likely to 
be liquidity constrained and pension funds are quite illiquid as they are typically subject 
to penalties for early withdrawal. Also, in general, the “young” tend to accumulate less 
long-term financial assets, due for example to savings for home purchasing or mortgage 
repayments. By contrast, the “old” may be participating and investing more in the market 
for pension funds because they are wealthier and may be in a better position to incur any 
fixed cost that a pension fund investment may involve. Cohort effects, affecting 
individuals’ propensity to save and attitude toward pension funds, may also matter. 
Hence, a direct comparison between the behavior of the “young” and that of the “old” 
may be misleading and the analysis biased by unobserved heterogeneity in the 
preferences for savings. Similar considerations apply to comparisons between other 
groups of workers. This calls once again for multiple difference-based estimators that 
control for the relative changes in the behavior of individuals belonging to different 
groups.  
4.1.  Public pension cuts, pension fund availability and savings 
Our methodology to investigate whether the pension fund legislation had a 
differential impact on workers can be illustrated as follows. First we consider the effects 
on savings and retirement assets. Let D
g
h,t be a dummy denoting a group of workers who 
has been hit by the public pension cut. We proceed by interacting the dummies of 
equation (1) by D
g
h,t and estimate the following regression for savings:  
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i.e. if there are no systematic changes among the contributors (non-contributors) that 
were more affected by the pension reform nor among the contributors (non-contributors) 
that were less affected, then: 
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and the difference-in-difference-in-difference estimator, that can be implemented by 
running OLS on (4), is unbiased.
26 
Table (5) reports the results of the estimation. In practice, the dummy D
g
h,t 
corresponds to the “young” in the first column of the table and to the “middle-aged” in 
the second. In both cases, the “old”, who have been basically unaffected by the public 
pension reforms, are the benchmark. D
g
h,t denotes a public employee in the third column 
and a self-employed in the last. Private employees are the benchmark.
27 
Notice that the “young” and the “old” are well-defined categories only in the post-
pension reform years. To implement our estimator, we need to identify corresponding 
groups in the pre-reform years. We chose to denote as pre-reform “young” those who 
                                                 
26 The triple differencing takes care of any systematic change in the composition of contributors and 
non-contributors as to unobservable taste for savings. For the estimator to be unbiased, one must assume no 
reform-related systematic compositional changes across the groups of most-affected contributors versus 
non-contributors ceteris paribus, which we feel we can safely rule out. 
27 D
c
h,t is equal to 1 if someone in the household contributes to a pension fund, whereas D
g
h,t refers to 
the household head. Hence, we are implicitly assuming that, if the head does not contribute to a pension 
fund, but someone else in the household does, the pension reform has hit the head and the contributor in the 
same way (first two columns of the table) or that they work in the same sector (last two columns). 
According to the post-reform surveys, which allow us to single out exactly who in the household has a 
private pension, in 75 percent of cases the household head does. When it does not, in 75 percent of cases it 
is the spouse. Since the head and the spouse have often similar ages and education achievements, we feel 
that it is acceptable to assume that they have similar contribution histories and therefore have been hit in 
the same way by the pension reform. Regarding the assumption on the sector of employment, the working 
spouse of a public-sector employed household head is also a public employee in 60 percent of cases. The 
spouse of a self-employed is self-employed in 50 percent of cases. Finally, the spouse of a private-sector 
employee is a private employee in 90 percent of cases.  
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have worked for 5 years or less in the year of interview,
28 which corresponds to the 
median of the distribution of the years of contribution of the “young” in the post-reform 
sample. We also experiment with 11 years which is the maximum years of contribution 
possible in the post-reform period. We denote as pre-reform “old” those who have 
worked for at least 25 years, which corresponds to the 10
th percentile of the distribution 
for the “old” in the post-reform sample. We also experiment with a threshold of 21 years 
which corresponds to the minimum number of years of contribution. Those who have 
worked more than 5 years and less than 25 are classified as pre-reform “middle-aged”. 
The thresholds used in the regressions reported in the table ensure that the shares of 
“young”, “middle-aged” and “old” in the pre-reform years are close to the corresponding 
shares in the post-reform years. 
The top panel of table 5 focuses on total savings. The workers who were more 
severely hit by the pension reform do not seem to have taken advantage of the pension 
fund legislation, as all the estimated δ s are statistically insignificant. The other panels of 
table 5 look at non-retirement assets. The estimation results suggest that some 
substitution may be occurring. In particular, the “young” contributors, who presumably 
have little liquid assets to substitute out of, have significantly increased their debt. The 
estimated coefficient implies an increase of 35 percent of the mean (conditional on 
having some debt). The “middle-aged” have also increased their debt, by around 10 
percent of mean debt (among the indebted). Further, after the reform, with respect to the 
“old”, relative to non-contributors, “middle-aged” contributors appear to hold 
significantly less government bonds and bills, which they may have converted into 
pension fund holdings. The estimated reduction corresponds to almost 20 percent of 
mean holdings of government bonds and bills. 
Overall, based on the evidence of table 5, the “young”, public employees and the 
self-employed, i.e. the workers who were most severely hit by the pension reform, do not 
appear to save more as a result of the pension fund regulation. At best, they appear to 
contribute to private retirement schemes through substitution out of other saving 
instruments.  
                                                 
28 Information on the years of contributions to the social security system is not available in the surveys 
covering 1989 and 1991.  
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4.2.  Public pension cuts and participation in the market for pension funds 
The next and final step of our analysis is to consider the diffusion of private pensions and 
verify whether among the most affected by the public pension cut at least participation 
has increased relatively more than among the least affected. Participation is appraised by 
considering the propensity to invest in pension funds, as captured by the probability of 
investing. In practice, we estimate the following probit model to predict participation in 
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where Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution. The effect of the pension fund 
reform on the most affected by the public pension cut in this difference-in-difference 
probit is: 
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For identification purposes, we need the pension reform to be exogenous with 
respect to individual decisions to invest in pension funds. This can be safely assumed 
since, although the reform was expected, the exact type that eventually could be 
implemented was not obvious. To the extent that changes in the pension system were not 
fully anticipated, they can identify the relationship between public pension provision and 
individual saving and savings allocation choices. Finally, for the validity of our 
difference-in-difference probit estimator, we also need that all other shocks that may 
affect participation in the market for pension funds are aggregate and affect the most and 
the least affected in the same way. This is not the case for the pension fund regulation, 
which affected households differently depending on their age. In fact, the benefits of the 
tax deferral on pension funds contributions are larger the later is the retirement date. 
However, this is observable and can be controlled for through the inclusion of 
demographic variables. 
The first and second column of table 6 compare the propensity of the “young” and 
that of the “middle-aged” to invest in pension funds with the propensity of the “old”. The 
estimated δ s are negative, but statistically insignificant. This implies that the pension 
reform has not significantly affected the participation differentials between these groups.  
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In other words, after the pension reform, the diffusion of private retirement schemes 
among the “young” and the “middle-aged” did not change relative to the diffusion among 
the “old”, ceteris paribus. Results are robust to reasonable changes in the thresholds used 
to classify workers before the reform. 
  The last two columns of the table compare public employees and self-employed 
with private employees. Public employees are less likely to contribute to a pension fund 
than private employees and, after the reform, the difference significantly increases by 1.6 
percentage points (20 percent of the mean). The self-employed are more likely to 
contribute than private employees, but after the reforms, the difference shrinks by 6 
points (40 percent of the mean). The rise in these differentials is not due to a fall in the 
participation among public employees and self-employed, rather to a relatively sharper 
increase in the participation among private employees. As discussed earlier, this could be 
due to the fact that the supply of “closed” pension funds available to private sector 
employees has increased considerably over the past decade. 
Finally, since private retirement schemes are quite complex products, we 
investigate the impact of financial education on the propensity to invest in these 









h,t by a dummy that singles out the financially most educated 
(D
fin.ed.
h,t). As financially educated we take those who have at least a high school diploma, 
and presumably exhibit higher numeric literacy, and are relatively more involved in 
financial markets, i.e. invest in either mutual funds, or stocks or corporate bonds, or all. 
According to this definition, 35% of pension fund contributors are financially educated 
vs. 10% of non-contributors. As expected, financial education appears to be a crucially 
important determinant of the probability to invest in a retirement plan. The coefficient on 
the financial education is always strongly significant: being financially educated raises 
the probability of investing in a pension fund by over 80 percent of the sample means. 







h,t is positive and statistically significant. Since in terms 
of participation in the market for pension funds there is no difference between educated 
“young” and “old”, ceteris paribus, the positive coefficient implies that after the pension 
reform the diffusion of private retirement schemes has increased among the financially  
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educated “young” relative to the diffusion among the “old”. Instead, financial education 
does not seem to affect the propensity difference between “middle-aged” and “old”, nor 







h,t is statistically insignificant in these regressions. 
5.  Concluding remarks and policy implications 
Based on the evidence presented, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the pension fund 
legislation has not increased household aggregate savings. One would have expected that 
the lower risk and cost of pension funds would have had a positive effect on private 
savings, but this appears not to have been the case. Further, participation in the private 
pension market appears to be unrelated to the loss of retirement wealth due to the pension 
reform. Indeed, the most affected by the pension reforms do not appear to save more, nor 
to be increasingly more likely to invest in supplementary retirement schemes than the 
least affected. 
There are several reasons why the saving incentives may have not worked. One 
possibility is that they are poorly designed. Based on a through review of existing 
academic works on tax incentives and personal saving, Bernheim and Scholz, (1993) and 
Bernheim (1996) claim that the life-cycle hypothesis may have had an excessive 
influence on the design and conceptualization of empirical investigations concerning 
taxation and saving. While other behavioral hypotheses are mentioned in the literature 
with increasing frequency, this usually occurs to explain anomalous results, rather than at 
the stage of designing an empirical strategy. In part, this is no doubt attributable to the 
absence of sufficiently well-developed organizing principles for a compelling behavioral 
alternative. But even so, it is important to be aware of the potential for reaching 
misleading conclusions by imposing a potentially false structure on the data. 
Another reason why saving incentives may have not worked is that households 
have very low intertemporal elasticities of substitution (Hall, 1988). If so, it may prove 
difficult to raise savings via any voluntary mechanism. Furthermore, people may remain 
uninformed about the need and opportunities for savings or may have not understood the 
scope of the benefits enjoyed by pension fund contributions. This would make a clear 
case for investing public resources in the dissemination of information about future  
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pension rights and about the instruments available to accumulate a suitable level of 
wealth at retirement. The importance of financial education is confirmed by the fact that 
the more educated are significantly more likely to invest in pension funds than the 
uneducated. Also, financial education appears to be a crucial determinant of participation 
among the “young” after the pension reforms. 
A final possibility is that saving incentives may eventually raise savings, even if 
they have not done so, yet. In this instance, the policy implication is to be patient. 
Still, the pension fund legislation has not been completely ineffective because 
households do appear to contribute to pension funds, even though they seem to do so by 
reallocating some of their wealth from other saving instruments. In particular, they have 
substituted liquid assets, and in particular government bonds and bills, with pension fund 
investments and financed contributions by borrowing.  
These findings are consistent with the hierarchy of behavioral responses to 
taxation developed by Slemrod (1992) and Auerbach and Slemrod (1997). These authors 
find that at the top of the hierarchy of behavioral response is the effect of taxes on the 
timing of economic transactions. The classic example is corporate stock sales and the 
realization of capital gains. The next tier of responses includes financial and accounting 
choices, such as just the allocation of a given amount of savings to tax-favored vs. other 
assets. The least responsive category of behavior applies to agents’ real decisions, such as 
the level of savings. 
The effect on the allocation of savings vis à vis no effect on the level of savings 
raises issues relating to the efficiency and equity of tax-based saving incentives. If the tax 
incentives do not raise private savings, but just lead to a reallocation of existing savings, 
a question of costs arises. Still, there may very well be equity reasons to provide access to 
saving incentives to some groups, such as those with limited pension coverage. These 
issues are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Finally, it is worth stressing that the analysis points towards two elements that 
could significantly affect the choice to invest in a private retirement plan: financial 
education and the provision of “closed” pension funds.  
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Appendix 
A brief history of the Italian pension legislation 
The Italian social security system started as a defined contribution system, such that after 
retirement workers received an annuity based on the stock of their contributions to the 
system. The system was re-designed after World War II. The benefit formula was 
changed to defined-benefits after the post-war inflation dramatically reduced the 
purchasing power of the stock of contributions, which consisted mainly of fixed-income 
bonds. Within a defined-benefit system there is no strict link between individual 
contributions and individual retirement benefits. The stock of contributions by all 
workers funds the benefits paid out. Hence, for the system to be in equilibrium there must 
be a balance between stock of contributions and stock of benefits. The stock out of which 
benefits are paid increases with payroll taxes, with labor productivity, with the rates of 
employment and with general state budget contributions. It decreases with the aging of 
the population and with an increase in the share of elderly who are retired. 
  In the 1960s and 1970s, the system became progressively more generous with 
policy interventions aimed at increasing pension benefits and reducing retirement age. 
This and three external factors have contributed to the crisis of the system, and to its 
growing incapability to meet workers’ benefit expectations. The three factors are: 
1.  population aging; 
2.  drop in the employment rate without an offsetting increase in labor productivity; 
3.  large public sector budget deficits that do not allow any further public 
intervention to fill the gap between contributions and benefits. 
Italy’s subscription of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 and the acceptance of the 
criteria to join the Euro have called for a policy intervention to rebalance the social 
security system. The reforms that were subsequently adopted rely on 3 principles: 
1.  public pension to be determined according to new rules; 
2.  funded pension to be financed through new savings’ flows and/or through 
diverting savings from other uses (e.g. severance pay); 
3.  individual retirement accounts.  
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The social security reform consisted of the following main interventions: 
1.  The Amato reform of 1992 has modified the rules for computing public pension 
benefits, which become based on the last 10 years of earnings.
29 It has also 
increased to 65 normal retirement age (60 for women), for all categories of 
workers; it has increased to 20 the minimum number of years of contributions to 
be entitled to the public pension and to 35 that to be entitled to early retirement 
provisions for all workers. 
2.  The Dini reform of 1995 linked retirement benefits to contributions for those who 
had contributed to the system for less than 18 years at the end of 1995. In practice, 
the benefits are not based on the return of individual contributions, which are not 
actually invested. Rather, they are imputed and are based on the rate of growth of 
nominal GDP. For private sector payroll employees, the payroll tax rate is set at 
32.7%, out of which 8.9 points are paid by the worker. 
3.  Retirement account legislation of 1993 giving tax-favored status to individual and 
group retirement accounts. 
The Amato and Dini reforms envisaged a long transitional phase such that older 
workers’s pension wealth has been unaffected. For young workers the loss has been 
larger the steeper their earnings profile.  
  The reforms and its phasing in have been such that we can now distinguish among 
three types of workers subject to different pension treatments: 
1.  workers who had contributed to the social security system for 18 years or more at 
the end of 1995 and whose pension is based on a defined-benefit formula; 
2.  workers who had contributed to the social security system for less than 18 years 
and whose pension is partly based on a defined-benefit formula and partly on the 
notional defined-contribution formula, pro-rata; 
3.  workers who stared contributing to the social security system after 1995 and 
whose pension is based on the notional defined-contribution formula. 
                                                 
29 A very gradual phasing in of the reform was envisaged. During the long transition, the benefits 
consist of two parts: one based on the last five years of earnings, like before the reform; the other based on 
the last ten years; the two parts are weighted according to years of contributions paid before and after the 
end of 1993.  
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The Amato and Dini reforms were not enough to re-balance the system with the ratio 
between benefits paid and contributions received around 130% at the end of the 1990s. 
To cover forecasted expenditure, payroll taxes should be raised to 43%, versus the 
current 33%. Alternatively, benefits should be cut by 25%. 
Table A1 summarizes the implications of the pension reforms for workers 
replacements ratios of pension benefits to earnings. The statutory replacement rates of 
before and after the reform are taken from Bottazzi et al. 2005 and refer to a worker 
retiring at 62 years of age, after 37 years of contributions. They are based on the 
assumptions that the growth rate of individual earnings is 2 percent per year and that the 
growth rate of GDP is 1.5 percent. The replacement rate is defined as the ratio between 
the first year’s pension and the last year’s earnings. The table distinguishes among private 
sector employees, public sector employees and self-employed, among old, middle-aged 
and young individuals, and between pre- and post-reform. In the pre-reform regime, the 
replacement rates were the same for all workers within each occupational category, but 
vary across occupation. For private sector employees it amounted to 71.1 percent, for 
public sector employees to 86.2 and for the self-employed to 67.8. After the reforms, the 
rates have remained substantially the same for the “old” workers, except for “old” public 
employees who have experienced a loss of 5 percentage points. Within each occupation 
category, the loss is largest for young workers. Across categories, the self-employed have 
experienced the largest loss. The table reports also workers’ expectation of replacement 
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Table 1 – Pension fund contributors 
 1989-91  1998-2006 
Share of households with someone contributing to 
a pension fund (%) 
8.5 14.7 
Share of households with head contributing to a 
pension fund (%) 
- 12.2 




    
Share of households contributing to a pension fund 
with an “old” head (%) 
- 14.9 
Share of households contributing to a pension fund 
with a “middle-aged” head (%) 
- 15.0 
Share of households contributing to a pension fund 
with a “young” head (%) 
- 11.2 
    
Share of households contributing to a pension fund 
with head employed in the private sector (%) 
7.2 15.3 
Share of households contributing to a pension fund 
with head employed in the public sector (%) 
7.0 13.2 
Share of households contributing to a pension fund 
with self-employed head (%) 
13.3 15.4 
    
Median contribution (for contributors)   775  1,106 
Median ratio of contribution to income (percent)  3.3  3.1 
Note: Data are weighted to represent the Italian population in the year of the survey.  
(a) Potential contributors include all individuals who are member of a household, are aged 
between 20 and 60 and receive some income. “Old” workers denote those workers who had 
contributed for 18 years or more to the social security system at the end of 1995; “middle-
aged” workers denote those who had contributed for less than 18 years; “young” workers 
denote those who started contributing after the end of 1995. Median contributions are in 
euros of year 2004.  
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Table 2 – Characteristics of households with and without pension funds  
 1989-1991  1998-2006 












Mean  age  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Married  (%)  85.5 85.8 82.4 74.0 73.5 77.0 
Mean years of schooling  9.6  9.4  11.4  11.0  10.8  12.1 
Mean  household  size  3.4 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 
        
Median  household  income  29,800 29,200 38,500 29,400 28,100 38,100 
Median  per-ad.  eq.  consumption 9,100 8,800 11,800  9,800 9,400 12,000 
Median  saving  5,800 5,600 8,200 6,000 5,600 9,100 
Median  saving  rate  (%)  20.6 20.3 24.6 22.2 21.4 25.4 
        
Median  financial  assets  6,800 6,200 13,300  8,500 7,500 16,800 
Household  with  ‘risky  assets’  (%)  8.6 7.0 26.2  23.2  18.6  49.9 
Median  wealth    93,500  90,100  154,000 123,000 113,000 193,000 
Household  with  debt  (%)  22.2 21.8 25.9 34.8 32.8 46.1 
Median  liabilities  of  indebted  hh.  7,900 7,800 9,300 11,400  10,500  16,300 
Homeowners  (%)  60,5 60,0 64,9 63,7 62,2 72,2 
Homeown. with mortgage (%)
(*)  24,4 24,0 27,9 15,3 15,0 16,8 
        
N. of observations  9,767  9,055  712  17,188  14,602  2,586 
Note: Data are weighted to represent the Italian population in the year of the survey. Real values in euros of year 
2004. Per-adult equivalent consumption is computed using an adult-equivalent scale that attributes weight 1 to the 
households head, weight 0.8 to the other adults in the household and weight 0.5 to children. ‘Risky assets’ include 
investments in stocks and shares, corporate bonds, mutual funds and foreign assets. 
(*) The information on 
mortgages is not available in 1989 and 1991. Hence, for 1989-1991 we report the share of homeowners with 
positive financial liabilities.  
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Table 3 – The effect of the pension fund legislation on household savings 
 
 
Total savings  Savings less pension fund 
contributions 













      
Adjusted  R2  0.5593 0.5530 0.5556 0.5499 












N.  observations  26,419 26,419 26,419 26,419 
Note: The left-hand side variable (savings) is in 10,000 of euros. From the sample, we dropped those 
households in the top and bottom 1 percent of the savings distribution. In addition to the interaction 
between the dummy for pension fund investment (D
c
h,t) and the dummy for post-legislation period 
(D
post




h,t, a second-order polynomial in household 
income, age, education, gender, marital status, household size, number of income recipients, a dummy 
for children, dummies for public and self-employment, number of years in the labor force, dummies 
for homeownership and debt and dummies for municipal size and for area of residence. The 
instruments used in TSLS are 9 dummies for working in: agriculture; manufacturing; construction; 
trade; transport and communication; real estate and renting services and other professional or business 
activities; general government and defense; and, education or health and other private services. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 4 – The effect of the pension fund legislation on non-retirement wealth 





h,t  -0.039*** 0.268*** 0.014** 
 (0.011)  (0.075)  (0.007) 
      
N.  observations  26,809 26,801 26,815 
Adjusted  R2  0.1939 0.4901 0.3291 
Note: Liquid financial assets include only bank accounts and Italian government bonds and bills. The left-hand 
side variables are in 100,000 of euros. From the sample, we dropped those households in the top 1 percent of the 
distribution of the left-hand-side variable. See note to Table 3 for a list of the right-hand-side variables. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 5 – The effect of the pension fund legislation allowing for the heterogeneous 






vs. the “old” 
The “mid-






















Total savings           
  N.  observations  12,005 25,251 20,898 19,147 















Liquid fin.           
assets  N.  observations  12,190 25,619 21,152 19,375 















Government            
bonds  &  bills  N.  observations  12,237 25,712 21,214 19,450 















Real assets           
  N.  observations  12,162 25,563 21,165 19,317 







h,t  0.075** 0.028** -0.013  0.011 
Debt   (0.038)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.019) 
          
  N.  observations  12,202 25,622 21,184 19,363 
  Adjusted  R2 0.3052 0.3136 0.3138 0.3118 
Note: Savings are in 10,000 of euros; non-retirement assets are in 100,000 of euros. The superscript “g” 
denotes the “Group of interest”. The dummy for the “Group of interest” takes on value 1 (0) if the 
household head is “young” (“old”) in the regression in the first column, if she is “middle-aged” (“old”) in 
the regression in the second column, if she is a public employee (a private employee) in the regression in 
the third column, and if she is a self-employed (a private employee) in the regression in the last column. 
The sample used in the first column excludes the ‘middle aged’; that in the second excludes the ‘young’; 
that in the third excludes the self-employed; that in the last column excludes public employees. On the 
right-hand-side, we include the same variables of the regressions reported in Table 3, plus the “group of 
interest” dummy alone and interacted with the pension fund investment dummy (D
c
h,t) and the dummy for 
post legislation years (D
post
h,t). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 6 – The propensity to contribute to pension funds: a comparison across different 




vs. the “old” 
The “mid-




















      
N.  observations  12,237 25,713 21,215 19,451 
Adjusted/pseudo R2  0.1131  0.1111  0.1240  0.1118 
Note: The estimates are based on probit regressions and report changes in the probability of holding a 
pension fund for a discrete change in the dummy variables. See Note to Table 5 for a list and description 
of the right-hand-side variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 




vs. the “old” 
The “mid-
































      
N.  observations  12,237 25,713 21,215 19,451 
Pseudo  R2  0.1315 0.1293 0.1442 0.1338 
Note: The estimates are based on probit regressions and report changes in the probability of holding a 
pension fund for a discrete change in the dummy variables. D
fin.ed.
h,t is a dummy that takes on value 1 if 
the household head has at least a high school diploma and hold either stocks, corporate bonds or mutual 






h,t  and their 
interactions, we include the same controls of the regressions reported in Table 5.  
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Table A1 – Public pension replacement ratios 










0.86 - 0.71 - 0.68 - 
Expected replac. 
ratio (ERR) 
0.83  0.82 - 0.81  0.79 - 0.72  0.67 - 
SRR-ERR  0.03  0.04 - -0.10  -0.08 - -0.04  0.01 - 
 
(2000-2006)










0.81  0.67 0.62 0.70  0.64 0.62 0.67  0.45 0.37 
Expected replac. 
ratio (ERR) 
0.80  0.73 0.72 0.72  0.67 0.66 0.60  0.57 0.65 
SRR-ERR  0.01  -0.06 -0.10 -0.02  -0.03 -0.04 0.07  -0.12 -0.29 
Note: Statutory replacement ratios are taken from Bottazzi et al. (2005). Expected ratios are based on the 
SHIW. The ‘Old’ are expected to contribute or have contributed to the public pension system for at least 18 
years at the end of 1995. The “Middle-aged” can contribute or have contributed to the system for less than 18 
years. The “Young” started working after the end of 1995. 
(a) The expected ratio is not asked in the 1998 
survey.  
 